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Brave New World: Challenges in
International Cybersecurity Strategy and the
Need for Centralized Governance
Susanna Bagdasarova*
ABSTRACT
In the past three decades, the Internet and related data system
technologies have revolutionized nearly every aspect of daily life,
making the word "cyberspace" a household term. Cyberspace, the field
in which these technologies operate, is characterized by global reach and
unlimited potential in terms of storage and communication. Billions of
people worldwide use the Internet in their daily lives, and that number is
only predicted to grow. Businesses, governments, and individuals
increasingly depend on the Internet to store large amounts of information
in these data systems. Unfortunately, as the use and types of uses of the
Internet and data systems grow, so do potential security risks.
In the last few years, cybercrime has become a growing problem,
affecting all types of Internet users and costing the world economy
billions of dollars each year. Recognizing the global scope of these
issues, the international community developed a series of conventions
and strategies to respond to cyberthreats.
This Comment discusses the current state of international
cybersecurity regulation by noting gaps and conflicts in the current
regulatory regime. This Comment then discusses the most pressing
concerns giving rise to the need for centralized regulation. Finally, this
Comment recommends the creation of a global regulatory agency tasked
with the development and enforcement of a coherent international
cybersecurity regime.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2015.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 2007, the first strikes of what would become one of the
worst cyberattacks in history hit the website of the Prime Minister of
Estonia.' The attackers next disabled the websites of the president and
government ministries, an act that paralyzed a self-described "paperless"
2government. Within days, newspapers, television stations, schools, and
banks experienced overwhelming traffic,3 at one point causing Estonia's
biggest bank to shut down its online service for over an hour.4 Triggered
by political anger over the relocation of a World War II monument, the
1. Steven Lee Myers, Cyberattack on Estonia Stirs Fear of 'Virtual War', N.Y.




4. Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in




bulk of the assault involved denial-of-service attacks.5 Hackers clogged
Estonia's cyber-infrastructure in waves, infiltrating computers from
6
around the world to magnify the level of network traffic. The attacks
increased network traffic by several thousand times the normal rate and
crippled the small Baltic nation for over two weeks.7
Though not the first large-scale cybersecurity breach,8 Estonia's
experience, dubbed "Web War I,"9 prompted a global conversation about
cybersecurity.10  The weaponization of cybertechnology not only
revealed the vulnerabilities inherent in dependence on cyberspace but
also brought the borderless nature of cyberspace into sharp relief."1
Unlike a missile, traveling from one determinable geographic location to
another through physical airspace, cyberattacks can travel internationally
through cyberspace in moments, implicating computers in countries far
from the original location of the hacker.12  During Web War I, for
example, hackers remotely rerouted attacks through unsuspecting
computers in other countries such as the United States and Vietnam, thus
prolonging and complicating efforts to respond and investigate. 
1 3
Other countries have experienced similar cyberattacks.14 In 2010, a
sophisticated cyberweapon named Stuxnet"5 infected industrial sites and
5. See id; infra note 49 (explaining denial-of-service attacks).
6. See Landler & Markoff, supra note 4.
7. See id.
8. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817,
829 (2012) (describing "Titan Rain," a U.S. cybersecurity breach in 2003 which leaked
sensitive information to Chinese hackers).
9. War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792.
10. See Landler & Markoff, supra note 4 (discussing the possibility of NATO
reexamining its commitment to collective defense in light of emerging cyberthreats).
11. See id. (discussing the technical methods by which hackers flooded Estonia's
servers, including infecting computers around the world with software to create
"zombies" that would then send traffic to Estonian websites).
12. See id
13. See id.
14. See id (noting cyberattacks in the Middle East and Eastern Europe).
15. Stuxnet is a software "worm" that infects computers running on Microsoft
Windows software. See How Stuxnet Works: What the Forensic Evidence Reveals,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8274488/How-
Stuxnet-works-what-the-forensic-evidence-reveals.html. Introduced into the Iranian
computer system via an infected memory stick plugged into a computer's USB port, the
worm ordered the centrifuges at the facility to spin at extremely high speeds for short
periods. See id. To delay detection of the damage, Stuxnet recorded normal operations at
the plant and played back the readings to plant operators during the attacks. See William
J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran
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nuclear facilities across Iran.16  The attacks devastated the nation's
nuclear program, destroying nearly 1000 of the country's 6000 nuclear
centrifuges and severely damaging the Natanz Enrichment Complex,
Iran's primary uranium enrichment facility. 17 Later confirmed to be a
joint cyberattack on the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and
Israel, the incident provided a glimpse into the future of cyberwarfare,
with attacks in the cyber-realm compromising assets in the physical
realm. 18
Governments are not the only entities affected by breaches in
cybersecurity.'9 In recent years, major companies such as Sony, Visa,
and Mastercard have experienced cyberattacks that exposed confidential
information and required significant system repair.2° In the 21st century,
many aspects of life involve the Internet, making nearly any entity or
individual using the Internet vulnerable to a cyberattack.21 Functioning
information networks provide the backbone of governments, financial
institutions, businesses, electricity and water infrastructures, and the
military.22  Individuals rely heavily on cybertechnology for work,
banking, shopping, communication, and entertainment.23
As dependence on cybertechnology increases in nearly every sector
of the government and economy, cybercrime increases as well.24 Each
16. Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 15.
17. See id.; Natanz Enrichment Complex, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Sept. 24,
2013), http://www.nti.org/facilities/170/; see also Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick,
Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say, WASH. POST (June 2, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-
israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6Ustory.html.
18. Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 17 (quoting one cyber-expert: "'This
officially signals the beginning of the cyber arms race in practice and not in theory"').
19. Brian B. Kelly, Note, Investing in a Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure:
Why "Hacktivism" Can and Should Influence Cybersecurity Reform, 92 B.U.L. REV.
1663, 1664-68, 1680 (2012) (discussing cybersecurity breaches involving various
entities, including Sony, PayPal, and San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit system).
20. See id. at 1664-65, 1680.
21. See Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council of European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, at 2-3, COM
(2013) 1 final (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union].
22. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 2 (2011),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/internationalstrategyfor cybe
rspace.pdf (describing various uses for cybertechnology).
23. See id. at 3. Cyberspace has even become a medium for the growth of social and
political movements, prompting Egypt to shut down access to the Internet during its 2011
revolution. James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt Leaders Found 'Off' Switch for
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/technology/16intemet.html?pagewanted=all.
24. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 2-3.
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use of cybertechnology exposes the user to potential cybersecurity
threats.25 While many of these threats are handled without incident,6
damaging incidents, such as Estonia's 2007 attack, are not uncommon.27
Unsurprisingly, cybersecurity has become a significant area of
international and domestic concern.28  Increasing dependence on
cybertechnology has prompted many countries to develop strategies to
regulate actions in cyberspace and improve cybersecurity.
29
Accordingly, the United States and the European Union released
cybersecurity strategies in 2011 and 2013, respectively.30  Both the
United States strategy ("U.S. Strategy") and the European Union strategy
("EU Strategy") address the growing significance of cybertechnology in
daily life and the need to create viable regulations.3'
The greater field of international cyberspace regulation currently
consists of a wide variety of national strategies, conventions, summits,
agreements, and organizations.32  Although some overlap and
collaboration exists, the piecemeal nature of the current international
cybersecurity regime leaves open gaps in policy and security.33 To fill
these gaps, it is necessary to approach an international cybersecunity
regime not as geographically divided parts, but as a unified whole in a
borderless cyberspace.34 The international community should develop a
global regulatory body for cyberspace and, in doing so, should look to
other examples of centralized international regulation.35
25. See id.
26. For example, the Pentagon reports ten million cyberattack attempts a day.
Zachary Fryer-Biggs, U.S. Military Goes on Cyber Offensive, DEFENSE NEWS (Mar. 24,
2012), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120324/DEFREG02/303240001/U-S-
Military-Goes-Cyber-Offensive.
27. See Hathaway et al., supra note 8, at 819, 829 (describing various cyberattacks
against countries including the United States and Burma).
28. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that
"governments across the world have started to develop cybersecurity strategies and to
consider cyberspace as an increasingly important international issue").
29. See id.
30. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 1.
31. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3-4; Cybersecurity Strategy of
the European Union, supra note 21, at 3.
32. See William M. Stahl, Note, The Uncharted Waters of Cyberspace: Applying the
Principles of International Maritime Law to the Problem of Cybersecuritv, 40 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 247, 263-65 (2011) (outlining existing international cybersecurity
regulations); see also infra Part 1i.D (discussing the current international cybersecurity
regime and noting significant treaties and organizations).
33. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 9 (noting
gaps in national cybersecurity capabilities of member states).
34. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing borderlessness as an inherent characteristic of
cyberspace).
35. See infra Part IV.
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This Comment will provide an in-depth examination of the current
field of international cyberspace regulation to illustrate the need for
centralized regulation. Part II will introduce the concepts of cyberspace,
cybercrime, and cybersecurity and contextualize them within the current
international cybersecurity regime. Part III will discuss the most
pressing concerns giving rise to the need for centralized regulation and
analyze how the cybersecurity strategies of the United States and the
European Union seek to answer these concerns. Part IV will offer a
recommendation to create a global regulatory agency to meet the specific
needs of cyberspace and cybersecurity regulation. Finally, Part V will
offer a brief conclusion.
1I. DEFINING CONCEPTS AND DEVELOPING CONTEXT
To understand the growing need for centralized cybersecurity
regulation, it is critical to define key cyber-concepts and outline the
existing regulatory regime. The three central concepts are: (1)
cyberspace, the realm in which information is exchanged and stored;
36
(2) cybercrime, various harmful and illegal activities occurring within
that realm;37 and (3) cybersecurity, a system of tools, policies, and
practices aimed at protecting information and assets in cyberspace.
38
Additionally, cyberspace is defined by unique characteristics that pose
regulatory difficulties, and the current regulatory regime is composed of
a patchwork of national and international strategies and organizations.
39
This Part will summarize these main concepts and the current regime in
order to better contextualize the discussion.
A. Cyberspace
Despite its ubiquity, "cyberspace" has proven difficult to define,
both as a result of its relative novelty and because of the permeable and
protean nature of its borders.40 As one court explained simply and
functionally, cyberspace is a "world of electronic communications over
computer networks.""' Scholars, on the other hand, have defined
cyberspace in more complex terms. One scholar defined cyberspace as
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infra Part II.B.
38. See infra Part lI.B.
39. See infra Part II.C-D.
40. See Lance Strate, The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and
Delineation, 63 W. J. OF COMM. 382, 382-83 (1999) (examining various issues in
defining cyberspace and creating a detailed taxonomy to aid in its discussion and
understanding).
41. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc, 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1365 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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an "evolving man-made domain for the organization and transfer of
data... a combination of private and public property governed by
technical rule sets designed primarily to facilitate the flow of
information.42
Novelist William Gibson, whose book Neuromancer contains one
of the first references to the word "cyberspace,43 offered an early,
colorful definition of the term as "[a] consensual hallucination
experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators .... A graphic
representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the
human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the
nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data.",44 Though not
couched in legal or academic terms, Gibson's definition perhaps best
conveys the complexity, vastness, and unlimited potential of
cyberspace-characteristics to keep in mind when analyzing issues of
vulnerability and regulation.
B. Cybercrime and Cybersecurity
The greater the volume of valuable data that individuals and entities
store and exchange in cyberspace, the more such information is at risk.45
This phenomenon increases the need for improved security.46 Many
security risks fall under the umbrella of cybercrime, which refers to
criminal activities in which a computer or information system is either
the primary tool or target of attack47 and includes a wide variety of
offenses, such as fraud, identity theft, incitement to racial violence,48
denial-of-service,49 and malware.50
Correspondingly, the field of cybersecurity encompasses a wide
range of protections, which can vary depending on the identity of the
user being protected.5 1 For individuals, the focus of cybersecurity is
42. Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare
with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 68 (2009).
43. See Strate, supra note 40, at 7.
44. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
45. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 3 n.5.
49. Denial-of-service attacks occur when a large number of computers are used to
simultaneously request information from a single website, overwhelming the server and
rendering the site inaccessible. United States v. Raisley, 466 F. App'x 125, 127 (3d Cir.
2012).
50. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 2 1, at 3 n.5. Malware
(malicious software) is a type of software that can cause damage to computer
performance and compromise its security. Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d
1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2009).
51. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 18.
2015]
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typically protection against identity or data theft,52 whereas for
businesses, the focus is usually prevention of fraud or forgery." On a
broader scale, when the user is an entire nation or government,
cybersecurity addresses protection from cyberterrorist attacks54 or
possible cyberwarfare.5'
C. Challenges to Effective Cyberregulation
In light of emerging cybersecurity threats, many governments have
recognized the need to formally address these issues, both nationally and
intemationally.56 However, four characteristics of cyberspace, and their
interactions with one another, pose challenges to the development of
effective cybersecurity regimes.57  Cyberspace is: (1) global and
decentralized,58 (2) anonymous,59 (3) pervasive,60 and (4) constantly and
rapidly evolving.61  By using these challenges as guideposts, the
international community may be able to successfully regulate cyberspace
on a global level.
1. Global and Decentralized
Perhaps the most significant and unique characteristic of the
Internet is its function as an inherently borderless medium of
communication.62 The Internet is not a physical place but a "network of
networks" that allows individuals with access to network-connected
computers to exchange information nearly instantaneously, regardless of
52. See id. at 3.
53. See id.
54. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 20 (outlining U.S. policy
in combating cybercrime internationally through collaboration and the rule of law).
55. See id. at 4 (recognizing the potential for traditional forms of international
conflict to extend into cyberspace).
56. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3.
57. See infra Part II.C (discussing the four challenging characteristics of cyberspace
in detail).
58. See infra Part I1.C.1.
59. See infra Part II.C.2.
60. See infra Part II.C.3.
61. See infra Part IL.C.4.
62. See Jessica E. Bauml, It's a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the
Challenges Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 697, 703 (2011)
(noting that the lack of borders gave rise, in the 1990s, to "a general concern that the
challenges the Internet presented to governing bodies would ultimately diminish the
relevance of the nation-state all together").
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where the individual is physically located.63 This system of networks is
not only borderless within a nation, but also internationally.
64
This limitless reach does create problems in terms of
cybersecurity.65 The decentralized nature of the Internet is evident in the
lack of an institutional owner or administrator of the underlying technical
66infrastructure, command center, or single storage location for
information.67  Cross-border threats have emerged as a result of this
constant and simultaneous interaction between various users.68
Combating these threats requires consideration of additional issues of
enforcement, jurisdiction, and conflicts of law,69 as there is no entity,
institution, or single physical location to be regulated.7 °
2. Anonymous
Another characteristic of cyberspace that poses a challenge to
effective regulation is the anonymity it provides to its users.71 As noted
by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Reno v. ACLU,72 cyberspace is
fundamentally different from the physical world in that its nature as a
system of interconnected data pathways allows users to easily mask their
identities.73 Although courts have noted that anonymity has proven to be
a positive force in the development of the Internet as a marketplace for
ideas,74 anonymity also poses a challenge to cybersecurity policy. 75 The
63. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (outlining an in
depth history of the Internet and its use in the United States as well as discussing First
Amendment free speech protections as they apply to the Internet).
64. See id.
65. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3.
66. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
67. Id.
68. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3.
69. See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime ch. II, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S.
No. 13,174, ETS No. 185 (calling for a harmonization of international cybercrime law
and laying out procedures for investigation and prosecution). The Convention on
Cybercrime is one of the most significant components of the current international
cybersecurity regime. See infra Part II.D.2.
70. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
71. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the
implications of anonymity for law enforcement regulation).
72. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding certain provisions of the
Communications Decency Act unconstitutional in that they abridged First Amendment
free speech on the Internet).
73. Id. at 889-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. See e.g., Doe v. 2themart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash.
2001) ("Internet anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of
ideas."); Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1213-14
(D. Nev. 2008) (noting that the court must balance First Amendment free speech
protections of anonymity with the interests of the discovery-seeking party when ruling on
a motion to compel discovery of the identities of anonymous Internet users).
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relative ease with which one can conceal one's identity aids
cybercriminals in carrying out attacks on computers and data systems.76




A third challenging characteristic of cyberspace is its growing
pervasiveness in the last two decades.78 Since the commercialization of
the Internet in the early 1990s,7 9 Internet users have grown to comprise
nearly 40 percent of the world's population and 77 percent of the
population of the developed world.80  In the first decade of the 21st
century, Internet use rose dramatically, with five times more users in
2010 than in 2000.8 1 Part of the reason the Internet is so pervasive is its
widespread availability.82  Furthermore, computer and Internet
technologies have become indispensible to daily life, with businesses,
governments, and individuals depending more on electronic data systems
for a variety of needs.83
4. Constantly and Rapidly Growing
Finally, not only is the Internet pervasive, but its use and reach is
growing exponentially.84 As cyberspace expands, so does dependence on
the technologies that make up cyberspace.85 Together, pervasiveness and
75. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 9.
76. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 4.
77. See id. (noting that "the ability to establish an anonymous virtual presence can
also lead to 'safe havens' for criminals, with or without a state's knowledge").
78. Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P: Kesan, Privatization of the Internet's Backbone Network,
51 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 93, 98-100 (2007).
79. Id.
80. Press Release, Int'l Telecomm. Union, ITU Releases Latest Global Technology
Development Figures (Feb. 27, 2013) (announcing findings that by the end of 2013, 2.7
billion people, or 39% of the world's population, will be using the Internet).
81. The Incredible Growth of the Internet Since 2000, ROYAL PINGDOM (Oct. 22,
2010), http://royal.pingdom.com /2010/10/22/incredible-growth-of-the-intemet-since-
2000 (compiling statistics on Internet growth between 2000 and 2010 and noting that
within that time frame, Internet users jumped from 361 million to almost two billion).
82. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832-34 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that
individuals may access the Internet through educational institutions, libraries,
workplaces, and at-home paid subscriptions to an Internet service provider).
83. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3 (describing various
industries and areas which increasingly depend on digital infrastructure, including
electricity and water, government, financial systems, and social and political
movements).
84. See Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 2002).
85. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 148 n.8 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a
ban on any computer equipment or on-line computer service as a condition of a lifetime
1014 [Vol. 119:4
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growth result in a simultaneous deepening and broadening of individual
and institutional reliance on cybertechnology.86  In turn, security
vulnerabilities grow and are exacerbated by the speed of technological
development and the ease of achieving anonymity online.87 As the use
and types of uses of the Internet expand, traditional crimes and conflicts
will extend into cyberspace.88 Lawmakers must keep up with the
extension of crime into cyberspace and create appropriate responses.89
The nebulous nature of cyberspace, however, along with user
anonymity and the irrelevance of physical distance, are challenges not
present in proscribing crime in the physical world.90 Thus, regulation of
cybercrime is not merely the application of existing law to cyberspace.91
Governments must consider the challenging interaction of the above-
described characteristics within the decentralized and borderless context
of cyberspace in order to develop effective strategies for regulation.
D. Cyberregulation in Context
In the last several years, many countries have developed individual
cybersecurity strategies.92 The last decade has also seen the rise of
international cooperation in the form of summits, regulations,
conventions, and treaties seeking to create standards and norms in
cyberspace.93 Briefly analyzing key conventions and organizations
reveals both the gaps in current regulation and uncovers tools for
building a global regulatory regime.
1. International Telecommunication Union
One of the most significant building blocks of the current
international cybersecurity regime is the International
term of supervised release to be overly broad and unworkable, particularly in light of the
level of incorporation such technology has in day-to-day life).
86. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3 (discussing the
increasing uses of cybertechnology as well as the growth of Internet use in the last half
century).
87. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 2-3, 9.
88. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 4.
89. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 888-92 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the difficulties of creating "adult zones" in cyberspace and noting developing
technology created to enhance law enforcement in cyberspace).
90. See id. at 889-91 (discussing geography and identity as markers that enable the
enforcement of criminal law in the physical world but that do not have exact analogues in
cyberspace). Justice O'Connor noted that traditional methods of regulation must be
reevaluated and modified in light of these differences. Id
91. See id.
92. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3.
93. See Stahl, supra note 32, at 263-65.
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Telecommunication Union ("ITU"). 94 A specialized agency of the
United Nations ("UN"), 95 the ITU is an intergovernmental organization
that focuses on key issues concerning information and communication
technologies, including coordination, access, and development.96  In
recent years, the ITU has recognized increasing cross-border threats to
cybersecurity and has noted the need to improve international
cooperation in the development of appropriate protective and punitive
mechanisms.97 One of the ITU's most pertinent initiatives is the Global
Cybersecurity Agenda (the "Global Agenda"), the goal of which is "to
provide a framework within which an international response to the
growing challenges to cybersecurity can be coordinated and
addressed.98
The Global Agenda recognizes that the absence of an overarching
organizational structure, coupled with legal loopholes within and
between nations, leaves individuals and nations vulnerable to cyber
threats.99 Suggested actions include harmonizing cybercrime legislation,
standardizing technical security measures, and creating organizational
structures for further cyberregulation development.100 Despite the Global
Agenda's collaborative vision for standardizing international
94. Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union,
reprinted in FINAL ACTS OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 24 (1992) [hereinafter
ITU Constitution and Convention].
95. See id.
96. See id. at 3-5; infra notes 209-10, 218 and accompanying text(discussing the
possibility oilITU cooperation with a global cyberregulatory agency).
97. ITU, Strengthening the Role of ITU in Building Confidence and Security in the
Use of Information and Communication Technologies, ITU Admin Council Res. No. 130
(2010), reprinted in COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 450-52
(2011).
98. Global Cybersecurity Agenda, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION 12,
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/new-gca-brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 4,
2014); see infra Part IV.B (discussing the Global Agenda in the context of a global
cyberregulatory agency).
99. Global Cybersecurity Agenda, supra note 98, at 10. In 2008, the International
Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats ("IMPACT") became the operational
home of the Global Agenda. International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber
Threats, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION 4-5(2011), http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/cyb/publications/2012/IMPACT/IMPACT-en.pdf IMPACT is a global public-private
alliance against cyberthreats whose mission is to bring various stakeholders, including
governments, industry, and academics, to develop policies and resources to enhance
global capability for dealing with cyber threats. See id. As of 2011, IMPACT is the
ITU's cybersecurity executing arm, responsible for providing cybersecurity assistance
and support to the ITU's member states, including the United States and EU nations, and
UN organizations. See id; see also infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text
(discussing IMPACT's potential role in supporting a global cyberregulatory agency).
100. Global Cybersecurity Agenda, supra note 98, at 14-20, 28-29.
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cybersecurity regulations, it is a suggested framework, not a binding
treaty. 1
2. Convention on Cybercrime
Another international agreement that has influenced the current
state of cybersecurity is the Convention on Cybercrime.10 2 Also known
as the Budapest Convention, the Convention on Cybercrime is a 2001
international treaty drafted by the Council of Europe'°3 to address the
growing problem of cybercrime.10 4 The Convention on Cybercrime aims
to harmonize domestic laws in order to streamline criminal investigations
and prosecutions of crimes involving computer systems and data.1
0 5
Key cybersecurity violations addressed by the Convention on
Cybercrime include forgery, fraud, copyright infringement, and child
pornography.10 6 Signatories to the Convention on Cybercrime are tasked
with adopting legislative measures to establish procedures as outlined in
the treaty,10 7 as well as cooperating with one another through mutual
assistance in the absence of pertinent agreements.'°8 The United States, a
non-member of the Council of Europe, and every European Union
member state has signed the treaty, thus indicating their recognition of
and support for a more cooperative cybersecurity regime.1 09
3. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime
As a supplement to the Convention on Cybercrime, the Council of
Europe developed the Additional Protocol to the Convention on
101. See id. at 8.
102. See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. No.
13,174, ETS No. 185; see also infra Part 1V.B (discussing the Convention on Cybercrime
as a possible template for a global cyberregulatory agency's regulations).
103. The Council of Europe is an international organization whose aim is to promote
cooperation between European nations in order to facilitate economic and social progress
and who focuses on fostering unity through the development of legal standards, common
actions, and the realization of human rights. See Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 1,
May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103.
104. See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 102, at pmbl.
105. See id.
106. See id. at ch. II § 1 tit. 2.
107. See id. at ch. II § 2 tit. 1 art. 14.
108. See id. at ch. III.
109. See Council of Eur., Convention on Cybercrime,
http://conventions.coe.int/Ireaty/Commun/print/ChercheSig.asp?NT= 185&CL=ENG
(last updated Feb. 1, 2014) (listing the signatories of the Convention on Cybercrime and
indicating that the treaty has been ratified by the United States and 36 members of the
Council of Europe).
2015] 1017
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Cybercrime (the "Protocol") in 2006.110 The Protocol is a response to
"acts of a racist and xenophobic nature [that] constitute a violation of
human rights and a threat to the rule of law and democratic stability."
' I1
Nations that have adopted the Protocol are required to criminalize the
dissemination of xenophobic acts through computer systems."2 Unlike
the Convention on Cybercrime, the Protocol lacks support from the
United States and several European Union member states, 113
underscoring the lack of standardized international regulation in
cyberspace and gaps in existing enforcement.
4. European Cybercrime Center
A recent but promising development in the field of international
cybersecurity is the European Cybercrime Centre (the "Cybercrime
Centre").14  Formed in January 2013, the Cybercrime Centre is a
European Union organization established to coordinate cross-border law
enforcement against cybercrime."5 The Cybercrime Centre intends to
fulfill a variety of initiatives, including raising awareness, developing
best practice on cybercrime investigations, and providing training to
combat cybercrime. 16  Perhaps the most significant aspect of the
Cybercrime Centre is its function as the European information hub on
cybercrime. 17 This function will centralize at least some information on
cybercrime, likely enabling the Cybercrime Centre to more successfully
launch targeted investigations and protective measures." 8
III. COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIES
The foregoing discussion is not a comprehensive view of
cyberspace and the international cybersecurity regime.1 9 However, the
uniquely challenging characteristics of cyberspace and the differing
110. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Jan. 28, 2006, ETS No.
189.
111. ld. at pmbl.
112. Id. at art. 3.
113. Council of Eur., Additional Protocol to the Convention,
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Cornmun/ChercheSig.asp?NT= 189&CM=&DF=&CL=E
NG (last updated Feb. 1, 2014).
114. See Bruce Zagaris, EU Opens European Cybercrime Center (EC3) at Europol,
29 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 111, 111 (2013); see also infra Part IV.C (noting that the
Cybercrime Centre could serve as a model for a global cyberregulatory agency).




119. For an in-depth overview of existing international law on cybercrime, see Stahl,
supra note 32, at 263-65.
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points of origin, missions, and methodologies of the current regulatory
organizations reveal a borderless domain of interaction without a unified
approach to regulation, despite the significant potential dangers of
cybersecurity breaches.120  Centralized international regulation will
provide an effective remedy for these concerns. This Part will analyze
the three main concerns giving rise to the need for centralized regulation:
national security, economic prosperity, and government transparency.
This Part will also analyze the ways in which two major
national/regional cybersecurity strategies, the U.S. and EU strategies,
121
attempt to resolve these issues and why such an individual method of
regulation will not succeed in cyberspace.
A. National Security
The first major concern giving rise to the need for centralized
regulation is national security. Financial institutions, militaries, and
governments have become increasingly dependent on cybernetworks. 1
22
As a result, cyberattacks, whether by criminals or states, can lead to
devastating results. 123 For example, undetectable until after the damage
had been done, the Stuxnet worm, jointly created by the United States
and Israel, surreptitiously and severely damaged Iran's nuclear program
120. See supra Part II.
121. In the last four years, both the United States and the European Union have
developed strategies to address the growing need for cybersecurity regulation both
domestically and internationally. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at
1-2; Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 1-3. Together, the
strategies of the United States and the European Union represent 29 Western countries.
Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/index-en.htm (describing the European Union's 28
countries). Furthermore, combined, the United States and the European Union comprise
approximately one quarter of the world's Internet usage. See Internet Usage in the
European Union, INTERNET WORLD STATISTICS (June 30, 2012),
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm (finding that, as of 2012, the European
Union comprises 15.3% of the world's Internet users); Internet Usage Statistics for All
the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATISTICS (June 30, 2012),
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm (finding that, as of 2012, the United States
has approximately a quarter-billion, or 10.2%, of the world's Internet users). Therefore,
although a number of other nations have developed cybersecurity policies, the strategies
of the United States and the European Union are particularly helpful in providing insight
into the future of international cybersecurity in developed Western nations. See
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3 (noting cybersecurity
strategies from the United Kingdom, France, and Russia).
122. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3.
123. See Landler & Markoff, supra note 4 (describing the effects of large-scale
cyberattacks on Estonia).
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without engaging any traditional weapons. 1 4  The attack was later
labeled an "act of force" by a research team from the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), 125 which noted that the attack was also
likely illegal under international law.126  Although Stuxnet attacked a
uranium-enrichment facility not directly connected to civilian life, it is
not hard to imagine a scenario in which a cyberattack targets critical
domestic infrastructure, such as the water supply. 
127
More recently, China has revealed the existence of specialized
cyberwar-capable units in its military and intelligence operations.128 In
addition, "some five dozen countries are building a military-cyber
operation.'' 129 As technology continues to advance, nations may view
cybertechnology as a more and more viable means of espionage and
warfare. 30  To combat a potential "MAD' 131 scenario in 21st century
cyberspace, uniform, global regulation is needed. Perhaps even more
worrying is the potential for cyberterrorism and the difficulty of
prevention and investigation in cyberspace.
132
The U.S. and EU Strategies diverge on the issue of national defense
in cyberspace.3 3  Improving military cyberdefense capabilities is a
separate and unique policy priority in the U.S. Strategy,134 both internally
124. Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 17 ("Effectively the United States has gone to
war with Iran and has chosen to do so in this manner because the effects can justify this
means.").
125. NATO is a military and political alliance comprised of 28 countries. What is
Nato?, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/nato/nato20l2/about/ (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015).
126. Shaun Waterman, U.S.-Israeli Cyberattack on Iran Was 'Act of Force, 'NATO
Study Found, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 3/mar/24/us-israeli-cyberattack-on-iran-was-
act-of-force-na/?page=all.
127. See generally Srinivas Panguluri et al., Protecting Water and Wastewater
Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks, 5 FRONTIERS EARTH Sci. 406 (2011).




130. See Dan Holden, Is Cyber-Terrorism the New Normal?, WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/2015/01/is-cyber-terrorism-the-new-normal/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2015).
131. MAD, or mutually assured destruction, describes a doctrine wherein two
countries each have a large enough nuclear store to destroy the other side and, should one
country be attacked, the other would retaliate in kind. See generally GETTING MAD:
NUCLEAR MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS ORIGINS AND PRACTICE (Henry D.
Sokolski ed. 2004).
132. See Holden, supra note 130.
133. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 20-21; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 11-14.
134. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 20-21.
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and externally.135 Internally, the U.S. Strategy notes the need to protect
the military's increasing dependence on cybertechnology.136 Externally,
the strategy discusses the need to develop military alliances in order to
enhance collective self-defense in cyberspace.137
Conversely, the EU Strategy does not address national security
concerns in the same way.' 38 The military is chiefly mentioned in the
context of coordination with civilian actors to develop cybersecurity best
practices.39 The EU Strategy does recommend harmonized legislation
as the first step in reducing cybercrime and increasing cyber resilience. 141
The proposals suggest creating minimum cybersecurity requirements for
all European Union member states14' and urge ratification and
implementation of the Convention on Cybercrime by non-signatories. 
42
Despite the recognition by both strategies that regulation
necessitates international and multi-stakeholder collaboration,143 the
potentially debilitating dangers of cyberwar and cyberterrorism militate
in favor of more uniform regulation and enforcement. The lack of a
harmonized approach by these two major strategies indicates the
likelihood of a disjointed international approach to a major international
security threat, a dangerous possibility in the face of rising
cyberterrorism.144 A centralized response system will be better equipped
to develop and control the weaponization of cybertechnology, and such
centralization is not unprecedented.
145
B. Economic Prosperity
A second major concern giving rise to the need for centralized
regulation is economic prosperity and security. Between 2006 and 2011,
the Internet "accounted for 21 percent of the GDP growth in mature
135. See id.
136. See id. at20.
137. See id. at 21.
138. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 11-14.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 5-16.
141. See id. at 5-6.
142. See id. at 9.
143. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21 at 17-19;
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17-24. The EU Strategy suggests a
variety of other actions to achieve its cybersecurity priorities, including the creation of a
single market for cybersecurity products, technical guidelines and recommendations, and
the development of best practices to enhance cybersecurity policy. See Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 12-13.
144. See Holden, supra note 134.
145. See infra Part IV.A (discussing other global regulatory agencies).
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economies."' 146  A more recent study in 2012 reported that "[i]f [the
Internet] were a national economy, it would rank in the world's top five,
behind only the U.S., China, India, and Japan, and ahead of Germany.'
147
Users access the Internet for banking, entertainment, news, technological
innovation, education, and consumer shopping, among other things.
148
Businesses use networks internally to facilitate the exchange of
information and to store consumer data. 1
49
The Internet has accelerated economic growth in many countries
through the diffusion of technology, increases in productivity, and
opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment.'50  Conversely,
cyberattacks on these systems are quite expensive.'15 Estimates of the
cost of cybercrime vary, with recent reports estimating that the United
States loses $100 billion each year in cybersecurity breaches.
15 2
Globally, those costs are estimated to be closer to $500 billion.153 Thus,
protecting access to the Internet and the integrity of networks is a
significant economic concern for the international community.
Both strategies acknowledge the significance of the Internet to
modem economies, but the United States and European Union diverge
on the types and levels of economic regulation required in
cybserspace.154 The U.S. Strategy stresses the importance of preserving
free trade and open markets in cyberspace and notes the reciprocal
relationship between economic competition and innovation and the
development of the Internet.'55 The U.S. Strategy can be interpreted,
perhaps unsurprisingly, as suggesting a limited role for government-a
146. JAMES MANYIKA & CHARLES ROXBURGH, McKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, THE
GREAT TRANSFORMER: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
PROSPERITY 1 (2011).
147. Press Release, Boston Consulting Group, Clicks Grow Like BRICS: G-20
Internet Economy To Expand at 10 Percent a Year Through 2016 (Mar. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.bcg.com/media/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=tcm:12-100468.
148. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3.
149. See Christian Lanng, Rethinking How You Use the Internet Is Crucial for
Business Efficiency, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/small-
business-network/2013/apr/23/using-internet-business-owner.
150. DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, OPEN FOR BUSINESS? THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF INTERNET OPENNESS 27 (2014) available at
http://www.dalberg.com/documents/Open for BusinessDalberg.pdf.
151. See Cybercrime Costs May Reach $500 Billion, Study Estimates, INDUSTRY




154. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17-18; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 2
155. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17-18.
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laissez-faire approach to cyberspace with the focus on individual
economic and personal freedom.
Although the EU Strategy recognizes the important role of
cybertechnology in the modem global economy,I1 6 the strategy addresses
economic concerns chiefly in terms of cybercrimes, such as espionage
and data theft.157 In contrast to the U.S. Strategy, the EU Strategy does
not discuss promoting open markets or improving free trade via
cyberspace.158 The EU Strategy does propose developing European
markets for cybersecurity products and technological research and
development.159 In this context, however, the European market is a
means to developing better tools for cybersecurity, rather than an end to
be improved through strategic regulation.160 The differing perspectives
of the economic role of cyberspace, and the attendant differences of
perspectives on regulation, indicate a strong potential for future
international disagreement. With an increasingly global economy
dependant on a completely global cyberspace,16 1 consistency and
centralization in cyberspace are necessary to successfully regulate and
protect eocnomic interests.
C. Government Transparency and Individual Privacy
The third major concern underlying the need for global
cybersecurity regulation is the principle of government transparency and
individual privacy.'62  In 2013, revelations regarding the National
Security Agency's ("NSA")163 surveillance of electronic communications
created significant privacy concerns among U.S. citizens.164  The
156. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 2
(explaining that "[information technology] now underpins the complex systems which
keep our economies running in key sectors such as finance, health, energy and transport;
while many business models are built on the uninterrupted availability of the Internet and
the smooth functioning of information systems").
157. See id. at 3.
158. Seeid. at 5-16.
159. See id. at 12-14.
160. See id. at 12-14.
161. See DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, supra note 150, at 1-3.
162. This subsection focuses primarily on individual protection from government
surveillance. Such surveillance is harmful for a variety of reasons, including its chilling
effect on the exercise of civil liberties and the potential for discrimination and
government coercion. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L.
REv. 1934, 1936 (2013).
163. The National Security Agency is a U.S. intelligence agency charged with
collecting signals intelligence. Frequently Asked Questions About NSA, NAT'L SEC.
AGENCY CENT. SEC. SERV., https://www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/about-nsa.shtml (last updated
Jan. 13, 2011).
164. JOHN W. ROLLINS & EDWARD C. Liu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL43134, NSA
SURVEILLANCE LEAKS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1-4 (2013).
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allegations, leaked by former NSA employee Edward Snowden and later
confirmed by the U.S. government, revealed a secret NSA program that
collected "Internet communications and stored data of 'non-US persons'
outside the US and those communicating with them."'165 Further leaks
revealed that the NSA monitored the telephone communications of its
allies, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Brazilian
President Dilma Rousseff.
166
The revelations caused an international outcry and prompted a
global conversation about he permissible boundaries of government
surveillance of private citizens and the level of transparency and
accountability required from government institutions. 67 In the months
following the information leak, many countries denounced the NSA
surveillance program.168  A report released by the United Nations
condemned such mass surveillance as "incompatible with existing
concepts of privacy" because "[t]he communications of literally every
Internet user are potentially open for inspection."'
169
The two strategies touch on the issue of government surveillance
differently. The U.S. Strategy does not clearly address the issue of
government surveillance, though references to "transparent
governments"170 and expanding government accountability171 could be
165. Susan Landau, Making Sense from Snowden: What's Significant in the NSA
Surveillance Revelations, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July-Aug. 2013, at 54, 54 (noting
that "[mlore leaks followed, with details about the US government spying on Chinese
computers [and] news that the NSA and its British counterpart GCHQ has used a
monitored Internet caf6 to eavesdrop on the communications of political leaders attending
the 2009 G20 summit").
166. Susan Landau, Highlights from Making Sense of Snowden, Part II: What's
Significant in the NSA Revelations, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan.-Feb. 2014, at 62,
62-63; Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/cover-
story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html.
167. See Landau, supra note 166, at 63.
168. Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, supra note 166;
Alissa J. Rubin, French Condemn Surveillance by N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/world/europe/new-report-of-nsa-spying-angers-
france.html?_rl ("French officials called the spying 'totally unacceptable' and
demanded that it cease.").
169. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, transmitted by
Note of the Secretary-General, 9, 18, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014). Another
report noted "the disturbing lack of governmental transparency associated with
surveillance policies, laws and practices, which hinders any effort to assess their
coherence with international human rights law and to ensure accountability." U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 48, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014).
170. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3.
171. See id at 8.
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broadly interpreted to condemn clandestine surveillance. Conversely, the
EU Strategy explicitly rejects government surveillance of citizens in
cyberspace."2  However, unlike national security and economic
concerns, the worrying differences are not simply between national
strategies but between the official words of the strategies and the actions
of the governments writing them.
Despite the implicit and explicit condemnations found in the
strategies, both the United States, through the NSA, and various
European Union member states, through their intelligence agencies,
engage in the interception and sharing of data gathered over cyber
networks.173  This leaves open the question of whether individual
cybersecurity strategies and regulations will be effective if disregarded
by both their authors and other cyberspace actors. The inconsistencies
and disagreements between the strategies on national security, economic,
and privacy concerns indicate potential difficulty in regulating a
borderless cyberspace through an individualized approach. Rather, the
global community must come together to develop a consistent
international cybersecurity regime to regulate an international cyberspace
that affects them all.
IV. RESOLVING DIFFERENCES: A GLOBAL REGULATORY AGENCY
Although both the United States and the European Union advocate
for international cooperation,1 74 it may be difficult to align differing
goals into a consistent cybersecurity regime through diplomacy and
multilateral agreements alone.175  Furthermore, recent allegations of
government surveillance of electronic communications by the United
States and European Union member states cast doubt on accountability
and adherence of nations to self-created policies.176  Meanwhile,
cyberspace and its attendant threats are only predicted to grow, leading to
greater interconnectedness and greater vulnerability.
177
172. See Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 3, 15-16.
173. See ROLLINS & Liu, supra note 164, at 1-4; Julia Borger, GCHQ and European
Spy Agencies Worked Together on Mass Surveillance, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/0 1/gchq-europe-spy-agencies-mass-
surveillance-snowden (describing electronic surveillance programs by German, French,
Spanish, Swedish, and British intelligence agencies).
174. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17-24; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 13-16.
175. See supra Parts II-III.
176. See supra Part III.C (discussing recent allegations of government surveillance of
citizens by the United States and European Union).
177. See supra Part II.C (explaining characteristics unique to cyberspace and their
effects on cyberspace growth and vulnerability).
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One solution to the problem of a fragmented cybersecurity regime is
the creation of a global regulatory agency. This agency would be tasked
with the development, implementation, and enforcement of a global
cybersecurity regime. Specifically, this agency would address
international cybercrime and suspected cyberwarfare in terms of
prevention, investigation, and prosecution. Limiting the scope of the
agency is necessary in order to provide the agency with a reasonable
mandate and increase the likelihood of international accord. The
international community must look to similar global regulatory regimes
and current international cybersecurity efforts to structure a successful
cybersecurity regulatory agency.
A. Blueprints for a Global Regulatory Agency
With governments, financial institutions, and individuals
increasingly dependent on cybernetworks,175 attacks, whether by
criminals or states, can lead to devastating results.179  A centralized
response system will be better equipped to develop and control the
potential weaponization of cyberspace, and such centralization is not
unprecedented.1 80 Indeed, the two most significant agreements between
the U.S. and EU Strategies are an emphasis on international cooperation
in the development of cybersecurity policy1 81 and a commitment to
adapting and applying existing norms and rules of law to cyberspace.
182
To guide the creation of a global agency for cyberspace regulation, the
international community should look to its management of two previous
threats to global welfare: chemical and nuclear weapons.
1. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
("OPCW")15 83 has successfully maintained international support for the
178. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 3.
179. See Landler & Markoff, supra note 4 (describing the effects of large-scale
cyberattacks on Estonia).
180. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
181. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17-24; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 5-16.
182. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 9; Cybersecurity Strategy
of the European Union, supra note 21, at 15. In addition to major similarities, both
strategies emphasize developing cybertechnology capabilities, increasing cyber
resilience, and reducing cybercrime through domestic and international measures. See
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 18-20, 22-23; Cybersecurity Strategy
of the European Union, supra note 21, at 5-14.
183. Alan Cowell, Chemical Weapons Watchdog Wins Nobel Peace Prize, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/world/chemical-weapons-
watchdog-wins-nobel-peace-prize.html.
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regulation of chemical weapons.184 The organization acts as a watchdog
to help carry out the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC") 185 and
sends inspectors to various signatory countries to ensure compliance.
86
The Chemical Weapons Convention itself is the product of over 60 years
of international efforts to ban the use of poisonous weapons.8 7  The
member states of the OPCW represent roughly 98 percent of global
population, landmass, and the worldwide chemical industry.88
The OPCW enjoys wide support and, in 2013, was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize.189 In its announcement, the Nobel Committee praised
the OPCW for its work in defining "the use of chemical weapons as a
taboo under international law."' 90 This "taboo-making" of a weapon or
crime is incredibly powerful and should become the goal for regulating
cyberspace. If cybercrime and cyberwar are treated as taboos because of
their potentially debilitating effects, regulation and enforcement is more
likely to be successful.
Although not necessarily life threatening, the destructive potential
of cybercrime'9' likewise requires support for centralized action. The
OPCW is an example of the potential for a mostly unified international
response to the threat of global harm.'92  A global cybersecurity
regulatory agency could similarly exist as a watchdog organization given
power to enforce international law through a convention or treaty.
Although cybercrime has not yet proven itself a grave enough threat to
attract unified support for central regulation, its ever-increasing ubiquity
may cause this to change.
184. Id.
185. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No.
103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
186. Cowell, supra note 183 (describing the aims of the Chemical Weapons
Convention: "to destroy all chemical weapons under international verification, to prevent
the creation of new chemical weapons, to help countries protect themselves against
chemical attack, and to foster international cooperation in the peaceful use of
chemistry").
187. Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban
on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and
Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 477, 479-85 (1999). The CWC followed a long
string of failed or limited attempts to ban such weapons, including the Hague Convention
of 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.
Id.
188. OPCW Member States, ORG. FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
189. Cowell, supra note 183.
190. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for
2013 (Oct. 11, 2013).
191. See Broad, Markoff& Sanger, supra note 15, (discussing the damage sustained
by the Iranian nuclear program as a result of Stuxnet).
192. See Cowell, supra note 183.
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2. International Atomic Energy Association
Another example of global regulation of potentially dangerous
technology is the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA").1 93 The
IAEA is "the world's centre for cooperation in the nuclear field" and
works "to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear
technologies.,194 Established in 1957 as an independent organization
related to the UN,195 the IAEA has 164 member states and is based on the
1956 IAEA statute.
196
One of the most important functions of the IAEA is its
establishment and enforcement of nuclear safety standards through "its
reporting system, site inspections, and safety assistance programs."'
197
Although the IAEA can apply its regulatory and enforcement powers
only when a state agrees to receive IAEA assistance, it remains
incredibly influential in developing international standards for nuclear
energy use.1 98 Indeed, like the OPCW, the IAEA and its Director
General at the time, Mohammad ElBaradei, were jointly awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize 2005.199 The Nobel Committee noted that despite
increasing nuclear threats, the IAEA represents international cooperation
in ensuring that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes.200 Further,
the IAEA has played a significant role in establishing five international
nuclear safety conventions in order to harmonize international standards
and create a centralized body of nuclear regulations.20 1  A global
cybersecurity agency could draw on the structure and work of the IAEA
as a template. The voluntary nature of IAEA regulation and enforcement
and the difficulties of preventing the increase of nuclear threats may
provide the architects of a global cybersecurity agency with examples of
methodology as well as potential obstacles.
193. Atoms for Peace, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iaea.org/about
(last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
194. The "Atoms for Peace" Agency, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
https://www.iaea.org/about/about-iaea (l st visited Mar. 28, 2015).
195. Id.
196. See Member States of the 1AEA, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
https://www.iaea.org/about/memberstates (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); DAVID FISCHER,
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 33-
35 (1997).
197. Karen McMillan, Note, Strengthening the International Legal Framework for
Nuclear Energy, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 983, 990 (2001).
198. Id.
199. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for
2005 (Oct. 7, 2005).
200. Id.
201. See McMillan, supra note 197, at 990-94.
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B. Current Support for a Global Response
Many aspects of such an agency already exist in part.202  While
neither the United States nor the European Union has indicated a
willingness to create any type of centralized cyberspace regulation yet,203
both support the Convention on Cybercrime204 and harmonizing
international cybercrime laws.2°5 Indeed, the Convention on Cybercrime
already addresses many challenges presented by international
cybercrime, including jurisdiction, extradition, and procedural powers for
investigation and prosecution.20 6
Although the Convention on Cybercrime applies chiefly to
European countries,207  its framework for the harmonization of
cybercrime law among signatories could be used as a template for
another international treaty on cybercrime and cyberwar. Similarly, the
Global Agenda208 advocates and establishes a plan for harmonization and
the development of a consistent international cybersecurity framework.209
As an initiative of the ITU, the Global Agenda, through IMPACT, is
open to assist any of the ITU's 193 member states and as of 2011 has the
support of 137 countries.21 These existing international agreements,
coupled with the U.S. and EU Strategies' spirit of international
cooperation,21 indicate international support for some global regulation.
Indeed, a growing user of cyberspace, China, recently indicated support
for international cyberregulation.1 2
202. See supra Part I.D, for a discussion of the current international cybersecurity
regime.
203. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 9, 22; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 17.
204. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Convention on Cybercrime in detail).
205. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 19-20; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 15.
206. See Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 127, at ch. II-111.
207. See Council of Eur., supra note 109 (indicating that the Convention on
Cybercrime is open to members of the Council of Europe and only a few non-members
including the United States, Argentina, and South Africa).
208. See supra Part II.D. 1 (discussing the development of the Global Agenda and its
goals).
209. See Global Cybersecurity Agenda, supra note 98, at 10.
210. International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats, supra note 99, at
4-5.
211. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 17-24; Cybersecurity
Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 13-16.
212. Ananth Krishnan, After Snowden Revelations, China Calls for Cyber Security
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C. Structuring a Global Cybersecurity Regulatory Agency
A global cybersecurity regulatory agency would have two main
points of focus: cybercrime and cyberwar. Cybercrime issues include
conflicts of laws, jurisdiction, investigation, and extradition, among other
things.21 3 Cyberwar issues include global agreement on the limitations of
the weaponization of cyberspace, diplomacy, and enforcement.21 4
Perhaps most importantly, the agency would require an international
treaty outlining its scope and regulatory and enforcement powers. Both
the OPCW and the IAEA are rooted in international agreement
manifested through treaty or statute.2 5 The Convention on Cybercrime
already addresses many of the issues of the cybercrime branch of a
regulatory agency.21 6 A companion treaty delineating international aw
on cyberwar could form the foundation for the regulatory agency.
In terms of structure, the UN provides a natural home for a global
regulatory agency.217 There, it could work closely with related UN
structures such as the ITU. 21 8 A possible inspiration for a blueprint of the
agency itself is the newly established Cybercrime Centre.21 9  Its
multifaceted functions as an independent information hub, training
center, and investigation resource 22 could be replicated and expanded to
apply beyond the borders of Europe. Such an agency could act as a hub
for interaction between law enforcement agencies such as Interpo 221 and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 222  It would also facilitate
international coordination of cybercrime detection and investigations.
213. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (describing issues covered by the
Convention).
214. See generally Hathaway et al., supra note 8.
215. See supra Part IV.A.l-2.
216. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Convention).
217. See ITU Constitution and Convention, supra note 94, at 24 (discussing the ITU's
position as a UN specialized agency, where it encourages cooperation in developing
telecommunication technology regulation).
218. See supra Part lI.D.1 (explaining the structure and purpose of the ITU and its
place in the existing international cybersecurity regime).
219. See supra Part II.D.4 (discussing the structure and functions of the Cybercrime
Centre).
220. See Zagaris, supra note 114.
221. See Overview, INTERPOL http://www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Overview
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015); see also Patricia E. Apy, Current International and Domestic
Issues Affecting Children: Managing Child Custody Cases Involving Non-Hague
Contracting States, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 77, 89 (1997) (describing Interpol
as an organization coordinating law enforcement and mutual assistance between its
member nations).
222. See About CIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 19, 2013),
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia; see also Daniel L. Pines, CIA & NSA: The Continuing
Viability of Totten v. Unites States, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2001) (describing the
origins and functions of the CIA).
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The agency could use the examples of the OPCW and IAEA to create
effective procedures for regulation. Indeed, countless methods and
structures for effective regulation exist, and the international community
has the ability to create an agency that would best suit the needs of global
users of cyberspace.
Although the scope and effects of cybersecurity threats are
global,223 neither the U.S. nor EU Strategy currently proposes centralized
regulation.224 The EU Strategy goes so far as to reject the notion of
centralized supervision because of the complexity of issues and actors.225
However, support for centralized regulation may increase as both
cyberspace and cybersecurity threats become more pervasive.226 Like
Aesop's well-prepared Ant,227 developing a global regulatory system
now may greatly benefit society in the future.
CONCLUSION
Cyberspace is a growing and evolving international medium of
communication. Individuals, businesses, and governments increasingly
depend on cybertechnology to complete countless daily tasks and
operations. This dependence has resulted in the storage of large amounts
of personal and official data in information system networks, requiring
the protection of cybersecurity measures. Unfortunately, as cyberspace
grows, so do potential cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities. The
unique nature of cyberspace poses challenges to regulation and
enforcement in cyberspace.
In response to these problems, the international community has
developed a piecemeal cybersecurity regime, and the United States and
European Union have contributed to this regime with individual
cybersecurity strategies. However, the disagreements between the two
strategies indicate that effective regulation may prove difficult to
achieve. Currently, there is no global regulatory agency to regulate
international cybercrime. As cybersecurity risks increase, however, the
need for a global regulatory agency will become more evident.
Regardless of the form of the global regulatory agency, the potential
costs of large-scale cyberattacks, both economic and personal, should
223. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 9.
224. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 22, at 8-12 (discussing various
options for international cybersecurity development but omitting the possibility of
centralized regulation); Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at
17.
225. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, supra note 21, at 17.
226. See supra Part lI.
227. See AESOP, AESOP'S FABLES 146 (V.S. Vernon Jones trans., Barnes & Noble
Classics 2003).
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convince the international community to centralize its cybersecurity
efforts.
